Jun Ma, Vadim Marmer, Pai Xu
This paper examines bid requirements, where the government may cancel a procurement contract unless two or more bids are received. Using a first-price auction model with endogenous entry, we compare the bid requirement and reserve price mechanisms in terms of auction failure and procurement costs. We find that reserve prices result in lower procurement costs and substantially lower failure probabilities, especially when entry costs are high, or signals are sufficiently informative. Bid requirements are more likely to result in zero entry, while reserve prices can sustain positive entry under broader conditions.
Quantitative mode stability for the wave equation on the Kerr-Newman spacetime
Risk-Aware Objective-Based Forecasting in Inertia Management
Chainalysis: Geography of Cryptocurrency 2023
Periodicity in Cryptocurrency Volatility and Liquidity
Impact of Geometric Uncertainty on the Computation of Abdominal Aortic Aneurysm Wall Strain
Simulation-based Bayesian inference with ameliorative learned summary statistics -- Part I