paper
The Banks Set and the Bipartisan Set May Be Disjoint
Felix Brandt, Florian Grundbacher
The Banks Set and the Bipartisan Set May Be Disjoint
Felix Brandt, Florian Grundbacher
paper2023-08-03English
Description
Tournament solutions play an important role within social choice theory and the mathematical social sciences at large. We construct a tournament of order 36 for which the Banks set and the bipartisan set are disjoint. This implies that refinements of the Banks set, such as the minimal extending set and the tournament equilibrium set, can also be disjoint from the bipartisan set.
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