This paper proposes a novel school choice system where schools are grouped into hierarchical bundles and offered to students as options for preference reports. By listing a bundle, a student seeks admission to any school within it without ranking the schools. This approach helps students who struggle to rank schools precisely and expands options on limited preference lists, potentially improving match outcomes. We design a modified deferred acceptance mechanism to handle bundle reports while preserving stability. Two laboratory experiments support our theory, showing that well-constructed bundles aligned with student preferences enhance welfare and match rates without compromising fairness. Practical applications are discussed.
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